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Abstract  
Economic integration plays an important role in trade, in knowledge diffusion and in economic growth. However, 
this role depends on the geographical distance between countries. The purpose of this paper is to study the 
geographical distance effects on the advantages of economic integration. To do so we extend the Romer and 
Rivera Batiz (1991) model by adding the distance between countries. Our main findings are: in the presence of 
the geographical distance effects (i) the growth rate does not double compared to autarky as in the Romer and 
Rivera Batiz model, ii) the share of human capital allocated to research sectors increases and (iii) the growth rate 
in centralized equilibrium is lower than that in decentralized equilibrium.  
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1. Introduction  
Several economists have shown that geographical proximity influences innovation and research in an open 
economy. (Grossman and Helpmann (1991), Keller (1997, 2000, 2001, 2002), Eaton and Kortum (2000), Breshi 
and Malerba (1996), Ben David and Rahman (1996), Maurice et alii (2002, 2004), etc...). The reasons are that 
the geographical proximity facilitates knowledge transmission across borders. Each country can benefit from the 
positive externalities if its neighbors are well endowed with R&D. Proximity increases the extent of knowledge 
transmission through formal and informal means. This is explained by the fact that trade requires transport costs 
which depend on the geographical distance. Proximity internalizes the technological spillovers and generates an 
interesting interdependences between the firms operating in the same fields . This role is very important, 
especially for the transmission of knowledges that require face-to-face interactions. Proximity is an important 
factor because of the non-rival nature of knowledges that are easily transmitted and with less costs between 
adjacent units. Indeed, despite the improvement and diversification of ICTs in the world level, face- to- face 
contacts remain the most important and easiest. However, these contacts are more expensive if geographical 
distance increases. In these conditions, more tacit knowledges are important more technology diffusion will be 
geographically concentrated.In terms of upstream and downstream relationship, the technological activities of 
neighbors reduce trade with very distant partners because the diversity of technological activities in a given 
geographical region increases the products differentiation and strengthens the relationships between customers 
and suppliers. It allows the development of new products that compete with those of other geographical areas. In 
addition, the variety of industries has a positive effect on the technological externalities: externalities are very 
important when industries are very diversified. Also, technological spillovers from FDI are dependent on the 
geographical proximity between the foreign and local companies. In this sense, FDI spillovers should first be 
received by their neighbors before other companies. When FDI workers move to domestic enterprises or when 
the joint-ventures unveil their products and technologies, the profits are first captured by the neighbors and 
spread gradually toward other companies more distant. This learning-by-watching effect represents a form of 
wild imitation which allows domestic firms to benefit from new products, new technologies, new techniques and 
methods of production, marketing, introduced on the domestic market by FDI (Teece (1977), Aitken and 
Harrison (1999)). Integration policies show the scope of geographical distance in trade flows and in international 
knowledge diffusion. Why for example Tunisia is not particularly more interested in an economic integration 
with Latin America or Asian countries and why the Tunisian policy is more oriented toward the European Union? 
Why Mexico is not very interested to cooperate with sub-Saharan countries than with USA and Canada ? Why 
Turkey accepts several concessions at the expense of its cultural and religious values to be a member of the 
European Union ? Does Turkey accept the same concessions to be a member of a more distant union? Answers 
to these questions are explained in part by the the geographical distance effetcts on trade between countries. 
Indeed, it is easier and less expensive for Tunisia to follow and to benefit from European R&D activities than 
from those of Latin American or Asian countries. Also, it is more interesting for Mexico to integrate with the 
Latin American countries than with the sub-Saharan ones and it is more profitable for businessmen, workers, 
exporters and importers in turky to take the European market as their first target. The reference model of 
economic integration and knowledge diffusion effects on economic growth is that of Romer and Rivera Batiz 
(RRB) (1991). Unfortunately, this model does not consider geographical distance effects. The objective of this 
paper is to extend the RRB model by adding geographical distance between countries. As in RRB model we 
assume that the two countries are symmetric everywhere, except for innovations which are different. The 
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Symmetry refers particularly to the identity of the absorption capacity, the human capital size and the 
externalities. 
 
2. The Model 
Our model is based on that of RRB (1991) . It is a model with two countries ( d  and f ) and three sectors wich 
are the the final good sector, the intermediate goods sector and the research sector.  
 
2-1) Final good and the intermediate goods sectors 
The production function is the same in the the final good and intermediate goods sectors . The production factors 
are unskilled labor  L , human capital H  and a set of intermediate goods produced locally and imported. In 
terms of production costs, we assume as in RRB model, that one unit of intermediate goods is equivalent to   
units of a final good.The quantity produced of each intermediate good is equal to x : the quantity z  is consumed 
locally and the rest ( m ) is exported to the other country  mzx  . The stock domestic capital is the sum of 
all available intermediate goods. In a symmetric equilibrium of two countries ( djdid xxx   ), the 
expression of the capial stock, in term of the final good, in the country d  is the following:  
0
d
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The production functions in the two countries are the following: 
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Where: 
- dY and dA  represent respectively the final good production and the number of intermediate goods produced by 
the country d  . dA represents  then the state of its home technology. fA is the number of intermediate goods 
produced by the country f ,and fY  is its production. 
-  iz  is the quantity of the intermediate good  i  produced and used by the country d . 
-  dfm j is the quantity of the intermediate good  j  imported from the country f  and  fdm i  is the 
quantity of the the intermediate good  i   exported  to the country f  . 
In the following development we are interested only in the country d  and the same approach remains valid for 
the other country. 
In the production function q  is the key variable  0q .  dfD  is the distance between countries d  and f . The 
choice of the exponential shape is justified because it permits  putting 
dfqDe

between zero and one whatever 
the distance between the  two countries. In an extreme case, if q  is equal to zero, then  
dfqDe

is equal to one 
and both countries are completely opened and the geographical distance has no effect. Really, this is not possible 
because geographical distance between two countries is never equal  to zero. Moreover, geographical distance 
between countries is measured  by distance between Capitals and not by the distance between borders: for 
example the distance between Tunisia and Libya is equal to the distance between Tunis and Tripoli. 
If, 0fq  then, 
dfqDe

 decreases  and the proportion of varieties imported by the country d  from the country 
f  decreases if  the distance between both countries increases.  This means that If 0fq   then,  the innovation 
sector effects of the country f  on  the  production of the country d decline if the distance increases.  
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In the final good sector, the quantity purchased of each intermediate good corresponds to the equality between its 
marginal productivity and its price. 
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In the intermediate  goods sector, each  producer must pay a variable cost to productive factors and a fixed cost 
(equals to the price of a patent) to the domestic or foreign research sectors (  ipA ). The total cost of the 
production of the intermediate good i in country d  is: 
             ipimiziPixixTC AfdA                                                       (5) 
Intermediate goods have no deprecation and the price of each good is equals to the rent paid by the final good  
sector. In these conditions, the total revenues of the monopolist of intermediate  good  i  on the domestic and 
foreign markets are: 
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dr is the interest rate in the country d  . The total profit of the monopolist  is: 
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The maximization of this profit implies 
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From the previous analysis we determine the equilibrium quantities  iz  and  im fd   and their prices:  
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2-2. The balance of Trade equilibrium 
Trade between the two countries depends only on the exchange of intermediate goods. The final good is non-
exchangeable. Trade equalizes the equilibrium present prices of all intermediate goods in the two countries. The 
equality of these prices and that of the production elasticities of intermediate goods (   1  ) generate the 
equality of all demanded quantities.  
For each country, trade equilibrium is equivalent to the equality between its imports and its exports. If the 
country d  produces dA  varieties of intermediate goods and exports to the country f , then the total volume of 
its exports dX  when we consider the geographical diatance is:  
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In a symmetric equilibrium,   dd pip   and   fdfd mim   . In these conditions, the nominal value of total 
exports 
N
dX  is: 
fdd
qD
ddd
N
d mAepXpX
df                                                                  (14) 
The total volume of imports of the country d  is   
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                                                 (15) 
The total nominal value of imports 
N
dfM  is 
dff
qD
fdff
N
df mAepMpM
df                                                                (16) 
The equality of exports and imports in country d   implies the following  condition of Trade  balance  
equilibrium. 
dffffddd mApmpA                                                                                   (17) 
Since the final  and intermediate goods  sectors use the same production function, then they can be combined in a 
single sector.  Thus, in the following analysis , we distinguish only between two sectors which are the research 
sector and another one of production. 
 
2-3.  The Knowledge accumulation 
The research sector accumulates innovations using human capital and the stock of  available knowledge 
(domestic and foreign). With the geographical distance variable, the knowledge accumulation function  in the 
country d  is  the following 
 fqDddAd AeAHA df 
.
                                                             (18) 
is the share of human capital allocated to the research sector in the country  d  
Researchers sell their innovations to intermediate goods producers at a price dAp  
 wich is a patent price 
and corresponds to a zero profit in the intermediate goods sector (arbitration condition). In these conditions, the 
profit equation is: 
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Replacing   by its expression from the equilibrium price )( dxp   , the expression of Adp   can be identified:  
    dddAd xxpr
p
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2-4.  Household Behaviors 
As in the RRB model we assume that households in two countries have the same preferences and maximize the 
following inter-temporal utility function.  
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Where c  is the consumption,  is the preference  rate for present and   the inverse of the inter-temporal 
elasticity substitution. Households choose between consumption and saving. The interest rate is  assumed to be 
the  same in the two countries because trade equalizes the return  rates of capital in the two countries  
( rrr fd  ). Taking into account the prefrences of housholds, the growth rate g  is given by the Ramsey- 
Keynes condition  

 rg
1
.  
In what following, we determine the growth rate given by the supply conditions. We distinguish between 
decentralized equilibrium  and centralized equilibrium. 
 
2-5. The  Decentralized equilibrium  and  Allocation of the human capital:  
Researchers  decide to work in the sector where they are better paid. In  equilibrium, the human capital mobility 
dAH
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implies the equality of its marginal productivity in all sectors. The marginal productivity of human capital in the  
production sectors is: 
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The marginal productivity of human capital in the research sector is: 
 
 fqDdAdA AeAPMPH df                                                                              (23) 
Since    jmiz    then, equality of the marginal productivity of human capital in all sectors implies                                        
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As  we replace the patent price by its expression, the previous equation becomes 
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Using the Trade  balance  equilibrium and the symmetrical  equilibrium of intermediate goods sectors in the two 
countries( dffd mmz  ) , we can deduct the following relationship between  x and  z  
z
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This relationship implies that the  intermediate goods production  is more important in the openenness  than in 
the autarky. The difference is more important when the size of foreign research activity is also important  ( fA ). 
In  the autarky, the intermediate goods sector produces only to satisfy the local market ( zx  ). This result 
shows that trade has a level effect on the intermediate goods production. But even in the case of openness, the 
intermediate goods production  decreases if the geographical distance impedes trade ( dfqD  increases).  By 
using the relationship between x  and z  and the equation which equalizes the marginal productivities of human 
capital in all the sectors, we deduce: 
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Since   )(zpxp  , when we replace )(zp  and z by their  equilibrium values ,we can determine the share of 
human capital allocated to the final good and inermediate goods sectors: 
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This equation shows that the human capital allocation depends on the geographical distance between both 
countries. Indeed, the share of human capital allocated to the final  good  and intermediate  good sectors  
becomes more important as the geographical distance increases.  Since the human capital is constant, then this 
also means that the share of human capital allocated to the research sector is more low if the two countries are 
very distant.  
The knowledge accumulation rate.  
In each country, the knowledge accumulation depends on the domestic stock of knowledge  and on the 
knowledge imported from the other  country. 
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By using the knowledge accumulation function in each country, we can express the knowledge evolution 
according to the shares of the human capital allocated to the research sectors in  the two countries, that is: 
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This equation implies that if both countries are very distant  then the knowledge evolution in the country d  
depends less on the human capital allocated to the research sector of the country f . Indeed, if the geographical 
distance between two countries is relatively  high, then the term Af
qD
He df

 becomes weak. 
The growth rates in both countries: 
       AfqDAdd HeHg df                                                  (31-a) 
       AdqDAff HeHg df                                                  (31-b)   
In each country, the growth  rate depends on the geographical distance between the two countries. The  main 
contribution of our model compared to that  of  RRB (1991) is when the effect of the geographical distance 
exists  0fq  then the growth rate is the same in the two countries but does not double compared to autarky.  
Indeed, when 0fq   then 1pdf
qD
e

, Therefore: 
 AfqDAdd HeHg df    <  AdH2                                         (32-a) 
 AdqDAff HeHg df    <  AfH2                                         (32-b) 
The growth rate does not double compared to the autarky because the geographical distance prevents each 
country to benefit fully from the human capital allocated by the other country to its  research sector. If the 
distance effect is total ( 0 dfqDe ) then the integration between the two countries  has no growth effect and 
each country regain its growth rate of autarky. 
 Add Hg                                                                                       (33-a) 
 Aff Hg                                                                                       (33-b) 
However, if 0q  , then growth rate in each country double compared to the autarky and our model will be 
equivalent to that of RRB (1991). 
   AdAfAdd HHHg 2                                                         (34-a)  
   AfAdAff HHHg 2                                                          (34-b) 
Result 1: Economic integration between two symmetrical countries does not double the growth rate in each 
country compared to autarky as long as the geographical distance plays a negative effect. 
 
2-6.  Effects on growth: 
Using equation 28, the fact that   

 rg
1
  and the equality of interest rates in two  countries,  then the 
growth rate with the geographical distance parameter is: 
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The growth rate depends negatively on the  geographical distance because each country benefits less from the 
human capital of its partner when the geographical distance is  high. 
The final good production function  in the country d  can be expressed as following 
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This expression shows a level effect  which depends on the number of imported intermediate goods. This level 
effect depends negatively on the geographical distance. Indeed, the final good production in country d  declines 
if the geographical distance between the two countries increases. 
 The coefficient 

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A
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which represents the level effect is a decreasing function of the distance 
variable.  In an extreme case, if the geographical distance prevents completely trade then the previous coefficient 
is equal to one and we find Romer (1990) model for an economy in autarky, that is: 
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2-7.  The Centralized equilibrium : 
In a centralized  equilibrium our model imply the following results: 
The human capital allocation : the share of the human capital allocated by two independent central planners 
(without coordination) in both countries are (see appendix): 
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According to these equations, the share of the human capital oriented to  the research sector in each country is an 
increasing function of the geographical distance. Indeed, 
op
AdH  and
op
AfH  increase when 
dfqDe

 decreases that is 
when the geographical distance is important.  
If we consider the two previous expressions as  reaction functions of two central planners, we can say that each 
central planner must rely less on the share of the human capital allocated to the research sector in the other 
country. This means that, each central planners  must reduce its opportunist  behaviour to benefit from the 
allocation of the human capital in the other country. We distinguish two extreme cases: 
If the geographical distance has no effect on bilateral trade between the two countries ( 0q  ), the two reaction 
functions will be: 
 
 



 dopAd
H
H    -   
 


op
AfH
                                    (39-a) 
 
 



 fopAf
H
H    -  
 


op
AdH
                                     (39-b) 
In this case, the opportunist behavior of the central planner is maximum and it can save the maximum of human 
capital that would have been allocated to the domestic research sector. Indeed, when 0q  then  1 dfqDe  and 
the share of human capital allocated to the domestic research sector is minimal. 
In the other extreme case, if the geographical distance prevents completely the bilateral trade between the two 
countries (
dfqDe

equals zero), then the two reaction functions show the higher share of the human capital 
allocated to the domestic research sector in each economy.  
This is explained by the fact that each central planner cannot benefit  from the human capital allocated to the  
research sector in the other country .In this case, the centralized equilibrium is equivalent to that of autarky and 
we find the same result as Romer (1990). 
 
 



 dopAd
H
H                                                                  (40-a) 
 
 



 fopAf
H
H                                                                  (40-b) 
When we compare the human capital allocation without and with geographic distance we find the following 
inequalities: 
 
   








 op
Af
qD
dop
Ad
HeH
H
df
  >  
 
   







op
Afd
HH
        (41-a) 
 
   








 op
Ad
qD
fop
Af
HeH
H
df
 >  
 
   






 op
Adf HH
        (41-b) 
Graphically, the non-co-operative equilibrium of two planners when we consider the geographical distance, 
implies that the two reaction functions intersect in a point which gives, in each country, the higher  share of 
human capital allocated to research sector. 
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Chart 1: Geographical distance effects on the human capital allocation toward the research sectors. 
With the geographical distance effetct, the intersection of the two curves in bold represents the solutions of 
the centralized equilibrium without coordination between the two planners.   
In contrast, the intersection of two other curves give the solutions of the same equilibrium when geographic 
distance has no effect on bilateral trade. It is clear that the share of human capital allocated to the research sector 
by each central planner increases if the geographical distance reduces the trade between the two countries. In this 
case, each planner accounts less on the foreign allocation  of the human capital and adopts a less opportunist 
behavior. 
If the two countries have the same level and the same allocation of the  human capital then, the shares of 
this factor allocated to the research sectors in the two countries in a centralized equilibrium with the geographical 
distance are the following: 
 
  



  dfqD
dop
Ad
e
H
H
1
                                                     (42-a) 
 
  



  dfqD
fop
Af
e
H
H
1
                                                     (42-b) 
If the geographical distance does not interfere completely the bilateral trade between the two countries, then 
the level of human capital, allocated to the research sector in each country, remains lower than its level in a 
centralized equilibrium of autarky but it is superior to the solution of a centralized equilibrium that ignores the 
geographical distance effect. Indeed, 
if 0 ≤
dfqDe

≤1  then  1≤ 
dfqDe
1 ≤2  and therefore : 
 
 



2
dH
  <  
 
  



 dfqD
d
e
H
1
 < 
 
 


 dH          (43-a) 
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 
 



2
fH
  <  
 
  



 dfqD
f
e
H
1
 < 
 
 


 fH
         (43-b)     
These two inequalities compare human capital levels allocated to the research sector, in countries d  and f , in 
the following cases: 
- Centralized equilibrium in the open economy without the geographical distance (the term to the left of the each 
inequality). 
- Centralized equilibrium in the open economy with the geographical distance (the term in the middle of the each 
inequality). 
- Centralized equilibrium  in autarky (the term on the right each inequality). 
These inequalities show that if the effect of the geographical distance increases (
dfqDe

converge to zero), then 
human capital allocation will converge to its level of autarky. This also means that as the geographical distance 
impedes the bilateral trade, each central planner cannot reduce the share of human capital allocated to the 
research sector.  
We show that the geographical distance, in a no-cooperative centralized equilibrium, has a positive effect on the 
world  human capital allocation to the research  sector because it prevents the opportunist behavior of each 
central planner. Indeed, in our model, the global human capital allocation (the sum of the two countries 
allocation) to research sectors is: 
- If the geographical distance impedes the bilateral trade between the two countries 
        
   
  



  dfqD
fdWorld
cedisA
e
HH
H
1
2
tan                                      (44) 
- If the geographical distance has no effect on bilateral trade between the two countries: 
       
   
 




2
2fdWorld
A
HH
H                                                (45) 
- If the two countries are in autarky: 
       
   
 




2fdWorld
AutarkyA
HH
H                                            (46) 
The comparison of these equations shows that the share of human capital allocated to the research sector in the 
world is higher if the geographical distance impedes Trade.  This share reached its maximum in the absence of 
trade between countries.  
 
   
 



2
fd HH
<
   
  



 dfqD
fd
e
HH
1
<
   
 


 fd HH
     (47)   
This implies 
World
AH  <  
World
cedisAH tan  <  
World
AutarkyAH                                                                             (48) 
Since the two countries are symmetric and have the same human capital allocation (as in RRB model (1991)), 
the growth rate of the centralized equilibrium in each country depends on the centralized allocation of human 
capital, that is: 
 opAfqDopAddcemtralised HeHg df   <  opAdH2  <  AdH2                               (49-a) 
 opAdqDopAfdcentralisefdcentralize
f
HeHg dfg
   <  opAfH2  <  AfH2                 (49-b) 
These two expressions show, in each country, the three following results: 
- first, if the geographical distance impedes the bilateral trade , then the growth rate of  centralized 
equilibrium is lower than the growth  rate of  decentralized equilibrium. 
- second, the growth rate in centralized equilibrium  and in decentralized equilibrium does not double after 
the openness. 
- finally, since geographical distance has the same effect on the two countries, so they have the same growth 
rate  in the cases of the centralized equilibrium  and in the decentralized equilibrium.   
 The equalisation between the growth rate which follows from the supply conditions and that given by the 
demand  conditions (  

 rg 1 ) , imply in each country these following growth rates: 
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- If the geographical distance impedes the bilateral trade between the two countries, the growth rate is:  
   
  



  dfqD
fd
cedis
e
HH
g
1
2
tan                           (50) 
- If the geographical distance has no effect then the growth rate is: 
   
 




2
2fd HH
g                                               (51) 
Result 2: If the geographical distance impedes the bilateral trade , then the growth rate of  centralized 
equilibrium is lower than the growth  rate of  decentralized equilibrium. 
Comparison between equations 50 and 51 shows that centralized growth increases if the geographical 
distance increases which seems rather curious and needs an explanation. In this model, growth depends on the 
share of human capital allocated to the research sector. However, we have shown that in a non-co-operative 
centralized equilibrium, and when the geographical distance effect is low, then planners will adopt an 
opportunist behaviors and allocate less of human capital to the domestic research sector. But , if distance 
impedes bilateral trade, then the opportunist behaviour becomes low and human capital allocation in favor of 
research sector becomes relatively more important. At the same state, growth increases as a function of distance 
because it implies a high share of human capital, allocated to the research sector. 
 
3. Conclusion 
In this paper we have extended the RRB (1991) model to study the geographical distance effects on the 
economic integration benefits . We have shown theoretically that geographical distance reduces economic 
integration effects on the economic growth, on the world allocation of human capital and on the research 
activities. In addition, the geographical distance effects create a sub-optimal centralized equilibrium. 
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Appendix: Human capilal allocation by the central planner in country d  
The program maximisation  of central planner in the country d is:   
 





0
1
1
1
max dte
c t


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
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&              (a) 
 fqDddAd AeAHA df &                                                                           (b) 
dAYdd HHH                                                                                            (c) 
To resolve this program  we use the Hamiltonian,:   
     fqDddAfqDddddAdt AeAHcAeAKLHHceH dfdf 
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1  et 2   are the present implicit prices of capital and knowledges.  
11 ue
t       and   22 ue
t   
c  and  dAH   are the control variables.   dK and dA  are the state variables. 
The first order conditions are:  
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Transversality conditions are: 
When t  then 01 
 t
d eK
  and    02 
 t
d eA
  
Equation (2) implies:  
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For a given values of H   and  L :  
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d
d
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A
A
u
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the path of balanced growth implies that the stock of capital and that of knowledge increase in the same rate:   
A
A
K
K &&
  
In these conditions, equation (6) implies:  
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Equations (1),  (2), (3) and (4) imply respectively the following relations :  
  1uc 

    and     cg
c
c
u
u
 
&&
1
1                                                                                (1’) 
 
     






f
qD
dddAdd
f
qD
d
AeAKLHH
AeA
u
u
df
df
111
2
1
                                          (2’) 
        dfqDddAd KLAeAHH
u
u
df1
1
1 1
&
                    (3’) 
     dAdfqDddAd HKLAeAHH
u
u
u
u
df  
  
 111
2
1
2
2
&
      (4’) 
Equations (2’) and (4’) imply :  
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The growth rate  in the country  d in the regular state state is given also by that of research  sector  
 AfqDAdAc HeH
A
A
ggg df
 
&
 
This expression of  growth rate and equation (8)  are used to determine the share of human capital allocated to 
the research sector by central planner.  
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